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* * * 
 
 
 Wilfrid Sellars is now widely recognized to be one of the most important of those 
twentieth-century analytic philosophers who argued that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
contains deep insights that can be adapted to address our own philosophical problems.1  Sellars 
expressed this outlook when he wrote that “Kant’s account of the conceptual structures involved 
in experience can be given a linguistic turn” and thereby “be seen to add essential elements to an 
analytic account of the resources a language must have to be the bearer of empirical meaning, 
empirical truth, and . . . empirical knowledge” (Sellars 2002a OAPK §31).2  In what follows I 
propose to examine the methodological aspects of Kant’s transcendental account of our 
“conceptual structures” that, I contend, Sellars took to be fundamental not only to Kant’s view 
but to influential themes in his own philosophy.3  The topics that I will focus on throughout, 
however, are not primarily those pertaining to Sellars’ more famous (or infamous) comparisons of 
Kant’s appearances/things in themselves distinction to Sellars’ own manifest image/scientific 
image distinction (cf. Sellars 1968; O’Shea 2018).  My first aim here is to clarify in some detail and 
to argue for the plausibility of Sellars’ particular interpretation of what he takes to be Kant’s 
“analytic” transcendental method in the Critique of Pure Reason (“analytic” in the sense that Kant’s 
own method is interpreted by Sellars as based ultimately on claims that are supposed to be analytic 
a priori conceptual truths), in particular pursuing some of Sellars’ references to the “Doctrine of 
Method” at the end of the first Critique.  This requires an examination of the nature of Kant’s 
“transcendental proofs” of synthetic a priori (SAP) principles, and in particular of how such proofs 
avoid a certain methodological trilemma of (1) an SAP regress (or question-begging circularity), 
 
1 I address the general topic of Kant’s relationship to twentieth-century analytic philosophy in general in 
O’Shea 2006, and then with particular focus on Sellars in O’Shea 2016 and forthcoming; the present quotation 
and a couple of short passages will also appear in the latter publication).   
 
2 I will follow the standard practice of referring to Sellars’ works by means of their abbreviations and with 
section or paragraph numbers where possible. In this case “OAPK” refers to Sellars’ “Ontology, the A 
Priori and Kant,” collected in Sellars 2002a KTM by Jeffrey Sicha. Sicha explains (p. 261) that OAPK was 
an unpublished typescript from the mid-1960’s (apparently revised by Sellars in 1970) which was to be ‘Part 
One’ of a longer piece, ‘Part Two’ of which was published as “Kant’s Theory of Experience” in 1967 (KTE, 
also in Sellars 2002a).   
 
3 Sellars uses our linguistic behavior as his model for understanding the nature of inner conceptual thinking, 
whereas Kant’s focus is directly on the logical form of concepts and judgments themselves.  However, 
given that in all relevant respects what Sellars wants to say about language he also wants to say, by analogy, 
about inner conceptual thinking, I will assume, at least for the purposes of this paper, that no obstacles 
arise from Kant’s primarily non-linguistic methodological approach to the nature and role of concepts in 
our cognition.  
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(2) merely analytic a priori triviality, or (3) a self-defeating reliance upon a posteriori hypotheses.4  I 
then examine in part II how Kant’s method, as interpreted in the analytic manner explained in part 
I,5 was adapted by Sellars to produce some of the more influential aspects of his philosophy, 
expressed in terms of what he contends is their sustainable reformulation in light of the so-called 
linguistic turn.  
 
 
I. Sellars’ “Analytic” Interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Method 
 
 
In the introduction to the first Critique Kant tells us that he calls “all cognition 
transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of 
objects in general,” and that a “system of such concepts would be called transcendental 
philosophy” (A11–12/B25).  For Sellars, Kant’s methodological shift from the direct investigation 
of reality that was characteristic of traditional metaphysics to the “transcendental” attempt to 
uncover the a priori principles that necessarily structure our sensory apprehension and conceptual 
understandings of objects, represented a decisive methodological step forward.   
 
Following Kant’s own frequent practice, let us take the a priori conceptual category and 
corresponding principle of causality as our lead example of the sort of thing that Kant means by a 
transcendental cognition in the above sense.  By what general method or approach does Kant 
attempt his “proofs” of such a priori transcendental principles as the famous “Principle of 
temporal sequence according to the law of causality” in the “second analogy” of experience, 
i.e. that “all alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” 
(B232)?  Like Hume, Kant holds that evidence derived a posteriori from the uniformities of past 
and present experience fails to account for the objective necessitation and the universality that the 
causal principle represents as governing the objects of our experience.  Similarly Kant agrees that 
no conceptual analysis of the subject-term of a causal relation will logically entail the concept of its 
 
4 What I am calling Sellars’ “analytic reading” of Kant is thus to be understood as referring to Sellars’ 
embrace of the second horn, mentioned in the main text here, of his own exam question trilemma to be 
discussed below. That is, I argue in favor of Sellars’ view that the ultimate premises of Kant’s transcendental 
“proofs” are conceptual analyses in the sense of consisting of non-trivial analytic a priori truths or 
judgments.  On Sellars’ reading, as we shall see, such “philosophical” knowledge roughly speaking consists 
in “analytic knowledge about synthetic knowledge” (involving the complex analysis, in particular, of  the 
concept of an object of possible experience), while nonetheless also avoiding the other two “synthetic” horns of the 
trilemma. The resulting ineliminable ambiguity in Kant between relatively trivial analyses of given concepts 
(e.g., “bodies are extended”) and significantly non-trivial conceptual analyses (such as those characteristic of 
Kant’s transcendental analytic in general, which Kant also describes as an analysis of the faculty of 
understanding (A65–66/B90–91)), will be noted as the argument proceeds.    
 
5 Sellars’ analytic reading of Kant’s transcendental method as discussed in this paper does not refer to, 
though it can be squared with, Kant’s well-known methodological distinction between the “analytic 
method” he is following in the Prolegomena as opposed to the “synthetic method” that he indicates he 
followed in the first Critique (cf. Kant 1783, 4.263–4; 4.274–5). A careful recent analysis of the latter 
distinction is Gava 2013, building on Bird 2006 and other commentators, which I take to be consistent 
with Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s method in the first Critique.  Along one dimension of that distinction, 
Kant in the Prolegomena assumes more directly the validity of the SAP principles to be found in mathematics 
and natural science than he does in the a priori synthesis-revealing analyses of the pure forms of sensibility 
and understanding provided in the first Critique.  Sellars’ reading is also consistent with Gava’s further 
argument that both of Kant’s analytic and synthetic methods are to be found within the first Critique as a 
whole. 
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predicated effect, or vice versa.  Hence Kant states that the “real problem of pure reason is now 
contained in the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” (B19). 
 
 In both the transcendental deduction (e.g., A92–4/B124–7) and in his account of the 
principles of pure understanding (e.g., A154–8/B193–7), Kant explains that in the case of such a 
priori synthetic judgments and principles it is the “possibility of experience” that “gives all of our 
cognitions a priori objective reality” (A156/B195; cf. A93–4/B125–6, A786/B814).    Earlier in the 
transcendental aesthetic, Kant had of course already argued that all our cognition of “inner” and 
“outer” objects is a receptive sensory experience of those objects as structured by the pure forms 
of intuition and hence as necessarily situated in one three-dimensional space and in a single time-
order.  Kant’s views on sensibility and the pure forms of intuition, space and time – including his 
signature transcendental idealist thesis that we can have knowledge only of appearances or 
phenomena, not of things in themselves or noumena, not to mention the recently much discussed 
“conceptualist” and “nonconceptualist” aspects of Kant’s view – were explored in innovative if 
controversial ways by Sellars.6  We shall return to the crucial role of sensibility below, but the 
aspects of the Sellarsian reception of Kant’s philosophical method that I will begin by focusing on 
concern those schematized principles of understanding that integrate the pure forms of thinking 
and sensibility in application to experience, and the objective validity of which, Kant argues, makes 
possible our experience of mind-independent, persisting and causally related material substances 
within one unitary nature.7   
 
 So again: by what method does Kant attempt to prove such synthetic a priori transcendental 
principles?  Consider the following challenging examination question that Sellars used to set for 
the undergraduate students in his Kant class at the University of Pittsburgh in the 1970s, in the 
form of a trilemma that confronts any candidate premises for Kant’s transcendental proofs (italics 
added):8 
 
6 See especially Sellars 1968 SM, Chs 1–2.  See also deVries 2005, Haag 2017, Landy 2015, McDowell 2009, 
O’Shea 2016, 2018, Rosenberg 2005, and Westphal 2010. See also, for a substantial investigation of many 
of the topics I will be exploring in this chapter, Jeffrey Sicha’s book-length introduction to his edition of 
Sellars 2002a KTM.  For recent work on Kantian conceptualism/nonconceptualism debates, see especially 
Schulting, ed. 2016. 
 
7 Sellars is among those interpreters of Kant who hold that the transcendental aesthetic cannot fully 
adequately accomplish its tasks, including in particular the explication of the nature of our singular 
intuitions, until the results of the subsequent transcendental analytic are in hand (cf. Rosenberg 2005, 62–
63: “The understanding turns out to be implicated in all cognition, singular as well as general”).  As Sellars 
puts it informally in his undergraduate Kant lectures, the “trouble is that Kant never went back and re-did 
everything that should have been re-done to bring the Aesthetic into keeping with the requirements of the 
theory of experience as he develops it in the Analytic” (Sellars 2002b KPT, 124; though he also remarks 
informally (KPT 178n): “What the Aesthetic does is to establish the noninferential character of our 
consciousness of spatial objects.  What the Principles do is to establish that the objects do have the kind of 
structure which entitles us to call them a physical world.”).  For recent contrasting discussions of how to 
approach Kant on sensible intuition in the Aesthetic in relation to the Deduction, see Allais 2017 and 
Conant 2017.  For the idea that Sellars represented a complex middle way on the current Kantian 
“conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism” controversies,  differing in important ways, for example, from John 
McDowell’s conceptualist outlook, see O’Shea forthcoming, §3, as well as Landy 2015. 
 
8 There are of course many closely related discussions by earlier generations of commentators concerning 
the question of Kant’s starting points and what premises he might be relying on in his transcendental proofs 
and in the transcendental deduction.  To mention just three: Stephan Körner’s 1967 (cf. 1966) would have 
been well-known to Sellars and raises an interestingly related trilemma objection, to which Körner (unlike 
Sellars) famously argues that Kant has no good answer (cf. Westphal 2004: 16–17); Kemp Smith’s earlier 
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“Either Kant's premises are proposed as analytic, in which case, if sound, his conclusions 
must be analytic and hence empty;  
 
or, his premises are proposed as synthetic a priori, in which case he is begging the question;  
 
or, his premises are proposed as synthetic a posteriori, in which case, if sound, his conclusions 
must be empirical hypotheses.     
 
Discuss.” 
 
 
Call the three options presented by the trilemma the “analytic” reading, the “synthetic a priori” or 
SAP reading, and the “empirical” or a posteriori reading of the nature of the starting points or 
fundamental premises of Kant’s transcendental deductions and proofs.  This question raises 
fundamental and longstanding questions of Kant interpretation, and it is not immediately obvious 
how Sellars would have addressed his own Kantian methodological trilemma.  But I think we can 
assemble some key aspects of his interpretation, which I suggest furthermore (though not 
uncontroversially) characterized Sellars’ own distinctively Kantian approach to philosophical 
problems, expressed in ways that reflected his having developed the “linguistic turn” or the “new 
way of words,” as he was wont to put it, in the particular ways that he did. 
 
 Sellars himself bluntly ruled out the SAP option:   
 
 
It is obvious to the beginning student that the truths of ‘transcendental logic’ cannot 
themselves be ‘synthetic a priori’.  If they were, then any transcendental demonstration 
that objects of empirical knowledge conform to synthetic universal principles in the 
modality of necessity would be question-begging. (KTE §10)   
 
 
It should be noted, however, that Colin Marshall has recently defended what he presents as a non-
question-begging version of the SAP reading such that Kant’s “own explanations take some 
synthetic a priori claims as explanatorily basic” (2014, 551, italics added), but not the SAP 
judgments that Kant attempts to prove from those basic resources.  Among the examples Marshall 
examines are the principle of contradiction, which he argues is not analytic for Kant; the 
fundamental distinction between intuitions and concepts itself;  the fact that we have just so many 
 
1923 commentary, which Sellars admired, raises partly related queries concerning the nature of Kant’s 
starting point (cf. 241–2, for example); and much earlier, the post-Kantian Jakob Friedrich Fries had raised 
what came to be known (via Karl Popper) as Fries’ or the Friesian Trilemma, and which has recently been 
examined carefully by Sperber 2017.  See also Marshall 2014 for what he calls the “Regress Argument” 
concerning Kant’s explanation of synthetic a priori judgments, which is laid out in terms of what amount to 
the same basic choices as Sellars’ exam trilemma, along with helpful citations to earlier literature.  In many 
cases this sort of challenge has led to the conclusion that Kant failed to ground his own philosophy 
adequately at this fundamental level (cf. Forster 2008, Chs. 11–12).  In addition, of course, there is a 
voluminous literature concerning the nature and fortunes of “transcendental arguments” in general: for a 
start, cf. Stern ed. 1999 and Ameriks 2003, Chs. 2–3.  For my present purposes here I will focus primarily 
on the question of how Sellars interpreted and appropriated Kant’s transcendental method. (My thanks to 
Willem deVries for a copy of Sellars’ undergraduate exam questions on Kant.) 
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logical functions of judgment; and that we have the particular forms of sensible intuition that we 
do have (2014, §§2, 4).  Marshall’s reading attributes to Kant “a short-range rationalist reflection” 
or “act of inner attention that justifies at least some claims concerning formal features of the 
mind,” arguing that “Kant accepts a doctrine of limited mental transparency” (2014, 566).  
Marshall indicates that his reading agrees with Karl Ameriks in holding that Kant was thus 
“advancing a modest form of rationalism,” though Marshall takes himself to be bringing out a 
basic rationalist methodological dimension that underpins Kant’s view, whereas “Ameriks thinks 
Kant’s methodology just involves deducing necessary conditions for ‘common experience’ ” (566n; 
Marshall cites Ameriks 2003, 4–12).   
 
 While I cannot examine Marshall’s textual evidence and arguments in detail here, we can 
contrast his approach with what Sellars’ alternative reading of Kant’s method seems to have been 
and explore the plausibility of the latter.  Sellars follows his curt dismissal, above, of the SAP 
option with the following claim: 
 
 
It must in a tough sense be an analytic truth that objects of empirical knowledge conform to 
logically synthetic universal principles. It must, however, also be an illuminating analytic 
truth, far removed from the trivialities established by the unpacking of ‘body’ into 
‘extended substance’ and ‘brother’ into ‘male sibling’. (KTE §10) 
 
 
This makes it clear that Sellars embraced what in some sense must be a version of the analytic 
reading or approach to the trilemma, an approach which faces its own textual and philosophical 
hurdles.  In fact, Marshall dismisses the analytic option (which he takes to be exemplified by 
Strawson 1966) in just two short sentences, appealing to Kant’s clear view that “synthetic 
judgments . . . can by no means arise solely from the principle of analysis” (Prolegomena, 4:267; and 
cf. A216–18/B263–5).  Marshall also cites Kant’s opening remarks in the Analytic of Concepts, 
“where Kant contrasts his project of analyzing the faculty of understanding with the more 
common project of analyzing concepts” (2014, 557n29; see also Land 2017, 510–11).  Here is 
Kant: 
 
 
I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis, or the usual procedure of 
philosophical investigations, that of analyzing [or “dissecting”: zergliedern] the content of 
concepts that present themselves and bringing them to distinctness, but rather the much 
less frequently attempted analysis [dissection] of the faculty of understanding itself, in 
order to research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them only in the 
understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is the proper 
business of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of concepts in 
philosophy in general. (A65–66/B90–91) 
 
 
However, we shall see that a non-trivial analytic reading can be seen to rely on, rather than being 
clearly defeated by the distinction Kant highlights in this passage, i.e., between the “usual 
procedure” in “philosophy in general” of analyzing given concepts “that present themselves” by 
“bringing them to distinctness,” as opposed to Kant’s own transcendental investigation of the 
possibility of a priori concepts by analyzing the “pure use” of the understanding in general.9   
 
9 The analyses of the a priori concepts (categories) of the faculty of understanding in its “pure use” as making 
experience possible are thus to be distinguished, for example, both from the analysis of concepts given a 
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 In the metaphysical deduction or “clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of 
understanding” that immediately follows the passage quoted above, Kant’s analysis of the pure use 
of understanding draws out, inter alia, that “concepts rest on functions” understood as “the unity 
of the action [or act] of ordering different representations under a common one,” and that “there 
is no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them,” concepts thereby being 
clarified as “predicates of possible judgments” (A68/B94).  No doubt it can be argued in 
accordance with an SAP reading that “the act” of mind described above requires a moderate 
rationalist synthetic a priori grasp of the mind’s own synthetic “actions,” involving a thesis of 
mental transparency.  However, it can alternatively be argued plausibly that by thus clarifying that 
concepts are general representations of objects in virtue of their essential role in  judgments as 
“functions of unity among our representations,” so that concepts “as predicates of possible 
judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object” (A69/B94), Kant is 
then able to offer in particular a “transcendental” (as opposed to merely “logical”) analysis  of how 
a priori concepts or categories of understanding function in their “pure use” in the possible 
cognition of an object – an “object” which is then further clarified as an object of possible experience 
as the transcendental analysis proceeds (cf. §19 of the B-Deduction in particular).  In comparison 
with what Kant views as the starting-point options presented by his empiricist and rationalist 
predecessors, the above transcendental analysis of concepts as functioning in the understanding’s 
judgments about objects plausibly meets the test of being “illuminating” or pregnant with further 
substantive philosophical consequences, while also arguably not resting either on unquestioned 
rationalist SAP assumptions or on the sorts of analysis of the content of given concepts that Kant 
regards as posterior to this properly critical, transcendental analysis. 
 
 The several notes that Kant wrote in his copy of the first edition of the Critique 
accompanying the passage cited above (A65/B90) lend further support to the view that by the 
“analysis of the faculty of understanding itself” Kant means that “the analysis [Analysis] of 
experience contains, first, its analysis [Zergleiderung] insofar as judgments are in it; second, beyond 
the a posteriori concepts also a priori concepts,” which includes showing that “experience” or 
“empirical cognition,” which “consists of judgments,” “is only possible through synthetic a priori 
propositions.”10  This and the other texts examined above suggest that Kant’s transcendental 
analysis takes our judged experience, as involving the concept of an object of our possible 
experience or empirical cognition in general, to be what is being analyzed in such a way as to display 
that SAP judgments and principles such as the causal principle are necessary for the possibility of 
such cognition.  
 
 Sellars’ analytic reading of Kant’s method accordingly stresses a point that Sellars 
repeatedly emphasizes, that Kant was “not attempting to prove that there is empirical knowledge, 
but to articulate its structure” (1967 KTE §45; cf. KTE §11; TTC §§51–6).11  This invites 
comparison with Ameriks’ much discussed argument a decade later in “Kant’s Transcendental 
 
posteriori, and also from the traditional analyses of the concepts “that present themselves” in rational 
metaphysics as allegedly given a priori without the need for any prior investigation of their possibility or of 
the objective validity of their “pure use” in relation to the objects of experience.  
 
10 These notes were published by Benno Erdmann (1881) and were translated and included in the Guyer 
and Wood translation of the Critique listed in the references.  The Erdmann and Akademie reference here is 
E XXXIII, pp. 21–2; Ak. 23:24–5.  Kant’s overall analysis of the concept of an object of possible experience 
here begins with an analysis of the nature of judgment and attempts to clarify the functional role of concepts 
“as predicates of possible judgments” (A69/B94), thereby exposing by means of the analysis the pure a 
priori forms of judgment and conception that make our a posteriori empirical cognitions of objects possible. 
 
11 See also Sellars 2002a KTM, 483–4 (= Sellars’ “Cassirer Lecture Notes,” CLN B38–41). 
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Deduction as a Regressive Argument” (in 1978) against what he called the “Received 
Interpretation” of the goal of Kant’s transcendental deduction.  The Received Interpretation, 
roughly put, is that Kant was attempting to defeat the Humean sceptic through a deductive 
argument from non-epistemic premises concerning subjective consciousness and our mental 
representations to the conclusion that we have empirical knowledge of an objective, SAP-lawful 
world.  Ameriks argues to the contrary that “the deduction” should be seen “as moving from the 
assumption that there is empirical knowledge to a proof of the preconditions of that knowledge,” 
that is, “to the universal validity of the categories” and of synthetic a priori principles (2003, 51, 
66).  Sellars agrees that Kant is not attempting to refute radical sceptical arguments directly on 
their own terms by justifying our beliefs in the face of such challenges (cf. Bird 1974).  He stresses, 
however, that Kant’s analysis of the concept of empirical knowledge “is such as to rule out the 
possibility that there could be empirical knowledge not implicitly of the form ‘such and such a 
state of affairs belongs to a coherent system of states of affairs of which my perceptual experiences 
are a part’,” where by such a “system” Sellars means Kant’s conception of a directly perceived and 
objectively lawful system of nature, as opposed to the sorts of allegedly incorrigibly known states 
of consciousness to which Descartes or Hume appealed.  Kant’s transcendental analysis thus 
indirectly 
 
 
undercuts both the skeptic and the ‘problematic idealist’ who, after taking as paradigms of 
empirical knowledge items that seem to involve no intrinsic commitment to such a larger 
context, raise the illegitimate question of how one can justifiably move from these items 
to the larger context to which we believe them to belong.  (Sellars KTE §11) 
 
 
 In holding that Kant’s transcendental method is based fundamentally on an analysis of the 
“complex concept” of empirical knowledge (KTE §9), is Sellars in effect combining the “analytic” 
and the “synthetic a posteriori” (empirical) responses to the exam question trilemma above?  The 
exam question portrayed the a posteriori horn as entailing that Kant’s “conclusions must be 
empirical hypotheses,” but this consequence would follow only if the supposed empirical premises 
consisted in the sorts of empirical facts that either are, or are appropriately explained in terms of, 
empirical hypotheses.  However, the general anti-sceptical starting point of Kant’s analytic method, 
namely that we have empirical knowledge in general, is warranted not by any empirical or 
explanatory hypothesis but rather indirectly by the misconceptions that the analysis reveals must 
plague any attempt to start out from premises that allegedly prescind from any such objective 
cognitive commitments in experience.  
 
 In support of the interpretation sketched above, Sellars remarks that “Kant’s discussion of 
philosophical method in the concluding chapters of the Critique shows that he was fully aware of 
these facts, and realized as well that ‘transcendental logic’ as knowledge about knowledge could consist of 
analytic knowledge about synthetic knowledge” (KTM §10 n2, italics added).  Unfortunately, Sellars here 
provides no specific references to what passages in the Critique’s multifaceted “Doctrine of 
Method” chapters he has in mind.  However, we can find such references in his notes for his 1979 
Cassirer Lectures at Yale, where he again asks whether “the propositions of Transcendental 
Metaphysics [are] analytic or synthetic? (They are a priori.)”  He continues: “Kant says that 
knowledge of principles through concepts only (as opposed to based on experience) is always 
analytic” (CLN in 2002a, 483–4); he then notes Kant’s assertion in the Discipline that “Philosophical 
knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts” (A713/B741),12 in order to draw his 
 
12 The full sentence in the Guyer/Wood translation is: “Philosophical cognition is rational cognition 
from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the construction of concepts.” 
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conclusion that “therefore” philosophical cognition, for Kant, “must be analytic” (ibid., 484).  Of 
course, this definition, if considered just by itself, would equally apply to the “dogmatic” rationalist 
analysis of concepts in Leibniz, as Kant himself makes clear in a note from the 1780s on the same 
topic.13  But following up Sellars’ two further page references to Kant’s text in this context clarifies 
the matter:  “…Therefore, [philosophical cognition] must be analytic.  We can’t know the causal 
principle through the concepts of event and cause.  We need the concept of ‘possible experience’. (See 
A736–7/B764–5 and A788/B816)” (Sellars 2002a, 484). 
 
 Just prior to the two paragraphs Sellars has cited in the quotation above (A736–7/B764–
5), Kant had summed up his “Discipline of Pure Reason” section by stating that philosophy must 
curb its dogmatic pretensions and in “its transcendental efforts” bring reason “back to modest but 
thorough self-knowledge by means of a sufficient illumination [or clarification: Aufklärung] of our 
concepts” (A735/B736). The subsequent two paragraphs then make clear that philosophical 
cognition cannot consist in merely “analytic judgments” about given concepts, which “do not 
really teach us anything more about the object than what the concept that we have of it already 
contains in itself”; nor can philosophical cognition consist in “direct synthetic judgments from 
concepts.”  Rather, the objective validity of synthetic judgments a priori is shown “only indirectly 
through the relation of these concepts to something entirely contingent, namely possible 
experience,” so that “an object of possible experience” is “presupposed.”  So while a synthetic a 
priori proposition such as that of causality “must be proved, it is called a principle and not a 
theorem because it has the special property that it first makes possible its ground of proof, namely 
experience, and must always be presupposed in this” (A736–7/B764–5).   
 
 The above passages are consonant with Sellars’ analytic reading of Kant’s transcendental 
method as (1) presupposing that we do have empirical knowledge or cognition, which is 
expressible most generally in the concept of an object of possible experience; and (2) as consisting in an 
“illuminating” analysis of that complex concept, which reveals the necessary role of synthetic a 
priori principles as making such an experience possible.  In this way Kant’s philosophical cognition 
could plausibly be described as consisting of “analytic knowledge about synthetic knowledge,” as 
we saw Sellars put it (KTE §10n2), since the analysis draws out the necessity of the relevant a priori 
syntheses for the possibility of experience. Furthermore, in the second of the two contexts in the 
Discipline cited above by Sellars, Kant indicates that every transcendental proposition “proceeds 
solely from one concept, and states the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object in 
accordance with this concept” (A787/B815).  Kant explains that in the Transcendental Analytic, 
the (SAP) causal principle, for example, was drawn out (ausgezogen) “from the unique condition of 
the objective possibility of a concept of that which happens in general,” by showing that “the 
determination of an occurrence in time . . . as belonging to experience would otherwise be 
impossible” (A788/B816, italics added).  
 
 I want finally to suggest that Sellars’ various comments on the role of the transcendental 
unity of apperception (TUA) in the transcendental deduction bring out another crucial respect in 
which Kant’s transcendental method, on this reading, is plausibly taken to provide “analytic 
knowledge about synthetic knowledge,” again without assuming SAP principles in mathematics, 
natural science, or metaphysics as premises.  And as I will also note further below, I believe that 
Sellars himself embraced Kant’s conception of the represented or thought-unity of the thinking 
self, developed in terms of his own broadly functionalist conceptual-role view of the nature of 
thought and intentionality, as a pivotal factor in his overall attempted “synoptic vision” or “fusion” 
of the “manifest and scientific images” of the human being in the world (cf. O’Shea 2016, Ch. 7; 
 
 
13 See R5645, 18:290, in Kant 2005, 273. 
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Rosenberg 1986).  I will focus here on the methodological aspects of Sellars’ account, which come 
to the fore straightaway when he remarks that while the TUA is perhaps “the central concept of 
the Critique, only recently has British and American philosophy freed itself sufficiently, first from 
its positivistic heritage, then from its anti-systematic bias, to be in a position to translate it into 
congenial terms” (‘I’ §6).   
 
 After allowing himself “to use the referring expression ‘I’ as a common noun,” the 
conceptual distinction involved in the TUA with which Sellars begins is “to the effect that ‘an I 
thinks of a manifold’ is not to be confused with ‘an I has a manifold of thoughts’ ” (1972 ‘I’ §§3–7, italics 
added).  Whatever kind of thing an I might turn out to be, there is a distinction between a manifold 
(for example, a succession) of thoughts or experiences in a consciousness, and the single thought 
or experience of such a manifold as a manifold (for example, as a succession).  Sellars’ Kant thus 
begins with our concept of a thinking self, not with any claim as to what the nature of such an I 
might be, as the most abstract form of our cognition or knowledge of a world about which we are 
not being ab initio sceptical, and the analysis of which ultimately reveals any such radical scepticism 
to be misconceived.    
 
 Kant’s categories or pure forms of thought are accordingly interpreted by Sellars as the 
“ways in which many thinkings constitute one thinking” (of course, why these particular ways is 
just one of the questions that arise in that context), and in particular as these concepts function in 
the “larger context” of our judgments about a world of objects and events in time and space (‘I’ §§8–
10).  Sellars then presents Kant’s TUA functioning in the latter, larger context as relating two TUA 
claims “analytically,” such that the a priori “form of empirical knowledge” takes the following form 
(the intervening comment below, “From this…”, is also Sellars): 
 
 
An I thinking a complex spatial-temporal-causal system of states of affairs – including, 
say, α and β. (The synthetic unity of apperception). 
 
From this synthetic unity, as Kant points out, it follows analytically that 
 
The I which thinks α is identical with the I which thinks β. (The analytic unity of 
apperception). 
 
 
Sellars presumably has in mind passages in the first two sections of the B-Deduction (§§15–16) 
such as this one: 
 
 
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness 
in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible 
under the presupposition of some synthetic one.  The thought that these representations 
given in intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I [can] 
unite them in a self-consciousness. . . . (B133–4, boldface in original) 
 
 
On the present understanding of Kant’s method, and in particular of its non-sceptical starting 
point of analyzing the concept of an object of our possible experience in general, the complex 
analytic entailment or conceptual presupposition in question can be drawn out in either of two 
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directions, as is in fact illustrated by the two passages above from Sellars and Kant.14  In this I 
agree with Sellars’ student Jay Rosenberg with respect to what he characterized as Kant’s 
conceptual “thesis of the mutuality of self and world” (1986, 6).15   
 
 There is obviously a lot more to be said about these last claims as the basis for a reading of 
Kant’s transcendental deduction.  However, I hope that part I has at least clarified and rendered 
plausible Sellars’ “analytic” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental method.  I turn now in what 
remains to an examination of how Kant’s method, so interpreted, was further adapted and 
reformulated by Sellars, in light of the linguistic turn, in order to produce some of the currently 
most influential aspects of Sellars’ own philosophy.  For present purposes I will present these 
Sellarsian themes compactly and in overview rather than in detail, in order to highlight and tie 
together their specifically Kantian methodological character. 
 
 
II. The Kantian Methodological Roots of Sellarsian Themes on Mind, Knowledge, 
and Nature 
 
 
 From his first serious readings in philosophy in his early twenties as a Rhodes Scholar BA 
at Oxford (1932–34) onward, Sellars was convinced that Kant was essentially right about the 
necessarily holistic and epistemically anti-sceptical conceptual structure that constitutes our direct 
perceptual knowledge of one unitary spatiotemporal, objectively law-governed world of physical 
objects and events in nature, the methodological underpinnings of which have been sketched 
above.16  Sellars, however, unlike Kant, thought that this Kantian conceptual structure itself would 
somehow have to be philosophically naturalized, in the sense of providing an explanation of its own 
possibility as arising and functioning wholly within the scientifically conceived natural world.  That 
is, for Sellars the “synoptic” philosopher must account not only for the origin but also for the 
irreducibly normative and social functioning of our Kantian conceptual-linguistic and sensory 
representational capacities consistently with an exhaustively scientific naturalist, evolutionary 
understanding of reality from top to bottom.  The key to what I call Sellars’ reconciling Kantian 
naturalist project was to provide, as he put it in his 1974 “Autobiographical Remarks,” “an adequate 
naturalistic philosophy of mind,” where in particular what “was needed was a functional role theory of 
concepts which would make their role in reasoning, rather than a supposed origin in experience, their 
 
14 An indication of this is that one can conduct the analysis in the transcendental deduction, as Kant himself 
does, both “starting from below” with the concept of an object of our successive apprehensions, and 
“starting above” with the transcendental unity of the “I think” in any experience (cf. O’Shea 2012, 132–49 
for an introductory clarification of each direction of analysis in the Deduction). 
 
15 Rosenberg 1986, 5–6: “What Kant argued, in his ‘Transcendental Deduction’, was that such an objective 
‘synthetic unity of apperception’ was not a mere phenomenological given but was, in fact, correlative to the 
(subjective) ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. In other words, the conditions according to which an 
experienced world was constituted as an intelligible synthetic unity were at the same time the conditions by 
which an experiencing consciousness was itself constituted as a unitary self. That an experiencer represents the 
encountered world as categorially structured in space and time, Kant claimed to show, was a condition of 
the very possibility of his representing himself as a unitary subject of his world at all.”  The “mutuality thesis” 
is an analysis of the conceptual structure of our cognitive intentionality, one which reveals, inter alia, the 
necessity of an objective conceptual cum intuitional synthesis a priori.  It is not an attempt to prove deductively, 
from non-epistemic premises concerning subjective consciousness, that we have knowledge or objectivity. 
 
16 For further biographical and philosophical aspects of Kant’s influence on Sellars, cf. Brandom 2015 Ch. 
1, O’Shea 2016, 4–7, and Sellars’ 1974 Autobiographical Remarks. 
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primary feature. The influence of Kant,” he reports, “was to play a decisive role” in his own 
developing views on these matters (Sellars 1974, 285–6, italics added). 
 
 Also vital to this project of thoroughly integrating the Kantian-normative “logical space of 
reasons” within the scientifically natural world was Sellars’ famous rejection, in “Empiricism and 
the Philosophy of Mind” (1956, EPM), of what he called the myth of the given.  In its most familiar 
form the latter myth, which Sellars argues is based on a variety of perennially tempting 
philosophical confusions, is the idea that there are some types of “immediate” sensory or rational 
cognition or states that by themselves – that is, without any essential dependence on the sorts of 
holistic conceptual structures discussed above – allegedly provide the experiencer or thinker with 
a direct recognition of what sort of quality or particular is being experienced (for example, this sensed 
redness), or of what basic facts or what self-evident principles of reason are directly apprehended 
or grasped (for example, that every event has some cause).  Again, for Sellars, it was Kant’s account of 
the thoroughly conceptualized nature of our sense-perceptual cognition of objects, when 
integrated with insights from the pragmatists, Carnap, Wittgenstein, et al., on the importance of 
language in partly constituting the more mature forms of human conceptual cognition and 
reasoning, that provided the key to Sellars’ own understanding of these crucial matters.   
 
 We can see how these Kantian themes developed, for Sellars, out of the methodological 
considerations discussed in part I above.  In “Toward a Theory of the Categories” (1970, TTC) 
Sellars explored what is involved in Kant’s view that “the pure categories are essential moments in 
the definition of the concept of an object of experience in general” (TTC §3).  His analysis 
eventually brings out, once again, the constitutive necessity in experience of certain non-analytic 
principles as objectively valid prior to (that is, on conceptual grounds that are valid independently 
of) any particular courses of sense experience given a posteriori.  For Sellars, Kant’s theory of 
categories represented a sophisticated advance in the tradition of Ockham’s earlier strategy of 
construing categories as meta-conceptual classifications of “mental words,” i.e., of conceptual 
items analogous to different types of linguistic category.  In Kant this became “the idea that 
categories are the most generic functional classifications of the elements of judgments” (TTC §23).  
For example, the judgment that the sunlight warmed the stone employs an empirical causal concept (x 
warms y), and this has as its underlying logical form the ground/consequence hypothetical form of 
judgment that structures the category of causal dependence (if the sun shines, then the stone 
warms), here applied within experience.  In Sellars’ own philosophy such categorial functional 
classifications of conceptual roles fall within a more comprehensive nominalist theory, building on 
insights from Carnap’s metalinguistic conception of ontology after the linguistic turn, of the meta-
conceptual classificatory role not only of categorial concepts but of all abstract terms.  Crudely put, 
philosophical vocabulary concerning, for example, properties, individuals (substances, particulars), 
and kinds are analyzed as culturally evolved ways of functionally classifying the socially rule-
governed roles of predicates, names, and common nouns across different languages (including, for 
Sellars, ‘mentalese’ as a partly acquired ‘language of thought’) in our judgments about objects and 
events.   
 
 Kant’s focus on the logical forms of judgment in general, as the clue or guiding thread to 
his analysis of the most basic categorial forms involved in the concept of an object of cognition in 
general, was thus on Sellars’ view a crucial methodological advance.  If we now consider the role 
of the categorial principles of understanding in their application to any finite sensory-perspectival 
experience, Sellars takes Kant’s analysis to have shown, correctly, that “the knowability of objects 
[must] consist, in large part, of inferential knowability,” and in particular “the concept of inferability 
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in accordance with laws of nature” (TTC §51).17  For example, in our spatiotemporal form of 
experience, experience of an object or appearance here-now is an experience, as Sellars puts it, of 
what is “on its way to being a there-then” object or appearance in the past, and “on its way from 
having been a there-then” object or appearance in the future (TTC §53).  So again, what “Kant takes 
himself to have proved is that the concept of empirical knowledge involves the concept of 
inferability in accordance with laws of nature. To grant that there is knowledge of the here and now 
is . . . to grant that there are general truths of the sort captured by lawlike statements” (TTC §54; 
cf. KTE §36).18  And Sellars once again concludes by tying these points back to the Kantian 
methodological standpoint elaborated in part I above:  
 
 
Thus, the transcendental knowledge that spatio-temporal objects of knowledge must 
conform to certain generalizations which are themselves logically synthetic is itself, according to 
Kant, analytic. (TTC §54; italics in original) 
 
 
As Sellars goes on to clarify further in this context (TTC §55), such synthetic principles are thus 
shown to be necessary relative to the assumption that we do have empirical knowledge of 
spatiotemporal objects in general. 
 
 It is important here again to bear in mind the ways in which Sellars adapted these Kantian 
methodological claims in “transcendental logic” about the necessity of inferential empirical 
knowledge of laws of nature, to the post-linguistic turn setting of what he characterizes as 
transcendental linguistics (KTE §40) or pure pragmatics (TTC §51).  Put briskly, one largescale Sellarsian 
adaptation of Kant’s argument for the necessity of logically synthetic yet necessary generalizations 
or laws within any framework of empirical knowledge was introduced in order to take account of 
the ever more striking instances since Kant’s time of radical conceptual change in logic, mathematics, 
and science. Here Sellars was able to build upon C. I. Lewis’s attempt to incorporate Kant’s key 
insight into his pragmatic (or framework-relative) conception of the a priori (Lewis 1929).  Going beyond 
Lewis, the epistemic requirement of lawful inferability was deepened empirically and semantically 
by Sellars in his account of the necessity of normatively sanctioned patterns of material inference (as 
opposed to purely formal-logical and analytic inference) to account for the very meaning or 
conceptual content of any empirical term, however basic.  Both of these broadly pragmatist 
adaptations of Kant’s methodological insights and conclusions featured early on in Sellars’ work, 
 
17 Obviously the relevant sense of inferability here is inferability within the objective domain, and not the 
misconceived Cartesian or “problematic idealist” attempt to infer from the subjective to the objective (cf. 
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism).  Note also that Sellars is not rejecting non-inferential or direct perceptual 
knowledge of physical objects: one can “recognize the essential and irreducible role of inference without 
denying the existence of non-inferential knowledge of the here-now,” which in fact Sellars accepts in his own 
Kantian account of our perceptual knowledge (TTC §51).  Sellars repeatedly stresses that non-inferential 
knowledge with inferential semantic and epistemic presuppositions is not the same as the Myth of the 
(presuppositionless) Given that he famously rejects (1956 EPM I §1 and VIII §32).  He also does not reject 
the idea that something is “given” to our passive sensibility in sense experience, but of what sort depends on 
Kant’s enduring insight that the categories are already involved even in our most basic singular sensible 
intuitions themselves:  “To be able to have intuitive representings, then, is to have all the conceptual 
apparatus involved in representing oneself as acquiring empirical knowledge of a world one never made” 
(KTE §36). 
 
18 I have offered an elaboration of the grounds for this form of argument, as exhibited in a line of thinking 
that runs from Kant through C. I. Lewis to Sellars and Brandom, in O’Shea 2015.  So I will not pursue it 
further here, though it is central to Sellars’ (and, for example, Brandom’s) Kantian methodological heritage.   
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most explicitly in his 1953 paper on Lewis entitled “Is There a Synthetic A Priori?”  Both 
adaptations were also essential to Sellars’ famous arguments concerning the myth of the given, 
since no recognition or awareness of any item as being of a certain sort is given independently of 
those inferentially structured and (for Sellars) always revisable and replaceable conceptual contents 
that make it possible to recognize anything as being any sort of item in the first place.  As Sellars 
expressed this key thesis in EPM, in a way that clearly reflects his Kantian transcendental outlook:   
 
 
For we now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that 
sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, 
and cannot account for it. (EPM §45; italics in original) 
 
 
Again, however, Sellars’ holistic concept-first and anti-“concept-empiricist” Kantian epistemology 
must be understood in the context of his fallibilist and explanatory pragmatism about conceptual 
change, and more broadly in light of his views on the socially norm-governed and scientifically 
evolving nature of our conceptual-linguistic capacities in general. 
 
 I noted earlier the driving scientific naturalist dimension of Sellars’ fundamental philosophical 
aspirations.  In fact, as Sellars saw things, it was ironically Kant’s conceptual methodological insights 
– which had inspired and fortified Sellars’ own views about epistemological and semantic holism, 
the myth of the given, the normative-functionalist nature of thoughts and intentions (and hence, 
of persons), and the meta-classificatory, rule-ish nature of meanings and other abstract entities – 
that first made possible a genuinely coherent and thoroughgoing scientific naturalism, one that might 
truly account for, rather than explain away, the irreducibly normative nature of all of the various 
human phenomena just mentioned.  For as was noted briefly in the closing paragraphs of part I, 
Kant’s conception of a thinker (an I, or a self) as a “form of representation” (A345–6/B40) rather 
than the representation of a certain kind of thing, 19 whether material or immaterial, was for Sellars 
(though he recognizes, not for Kant himself) the key to a normative-functionalist yet exhaustively 
naturalistic synoptic vision of the ultimate nature of thoughts as fully materially realized in the 
environmentally engaged states of embodied persons.20   
 
 Furthermore, the important ontological effect of the exposure of the myth of the given, 
for Sellars, was thereby to expose any conceptual framework, no matter how basic, as in principle 
replaceable by any framework that would more adequately conceptualize and explain the relevant 
empirical phenomena.  On Sellars’ own synoptic vision, whatever its ultimate merits (and it is not 
 
19 As Kant puts it in the Paralogisms:  “At the ground of this doctrine we can place nothing but the simple 
and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, 
but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept”; for this “consciousness in itself is not even a 
representation distinguishing a particular object, but rather a form of representation in general, insofar as it is to be 
called a cognition; for of it alone can I say that through it I think anything” (A345–6/B404, italics added)  
Roughly put, the thinking self is a unity in virtue of the a priori forms of conceptualized unity in terms of 
which it necessarily represents an empirical world of objects that exists independently of its experiences.  Again, 
for further interpretive details on this point from the present perspective, see Sellars 1972, Rosenberg 1986, 
2005, and O’Shea 2012, Ch. 4. 
 
20 Note, also, that I have left entirely aside for present purposes Sellars’ grapplings with the problem of 
qualitative sensory consciousness, or the “hard problem” as it is called today.  There is of course a Kantian 
dimension to this aspect of Sellars’ philosophy, by way of Kant’s views on sensibility (cf. Sellars 1968, Ch. 
1).   
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easy to make Sellars’ own systematic vision hang together in its entirety),21 this ongoing process of 
conceptual change must ultimately include the explanatory reconception of the basic object-
ontology of the sophisticated common sense or “manifest image” of the perceived world itself, 
resulting ideally in its wholesale replacement by a more adequate scientific process-ontology.  My 
concluding suggestion, however, is that the most important and overriding lesson that Sellars 
himself drew from Kant’s transcendental methodological analyses was that even such an imagined 
reduction and replacement as he envisions of our common sense ontology of objects by an ideal 
scientific image of the world would not be an elimination or reduction of persons as conceptually 
thinking, intentional agents perennially engaged in reconceiving and practically transforming both 
their shared social worlds and the independent natural world they inhabit and conceptually 
represent.22   
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